A policy-boundary MCP between your mailbox and your agents. Control what they can see and do in your inbox: which folders, senders, and attachments they can access, and where they can send email.
The agent can use mailbox credentials directly: relay folder and sender rules do not filter its view, and sends bypass relay recipient checks. In this illustrative journey, private mail goes out and an unsafe payload comes back.
Personal folder EXPOSEDConfidential email EXPOSED
02 / SIRENORELAY CHECKPOINT
Policy checks both ways
SirenoRELAY owns upstream credentials, authenticates the agent token, filters folders and messages, and checks outbound recipients before handoff. The guard withholds private mail and stops the unsafe return here; the owner's original mail is not deleted.
Personal folder BLOCKEDConfidential email BLOCKED
ONE REQUEST · TWO OUTCOMES
Giving an agent your full mailbox is dangerous.
The invoice request below is a concrete example: compare what an agent can see and send through SirenoRELAY with what it receives when it holds direct mailbox credentials.
OWNER MAILBOXSirenoRELAY · MCPAGENT
MAILBOXupstream · credentials stay here
Invoices3 messages
billing@vendor.testApril invoice · €420
newsletter@vendor.testHidden · sender not allowed
billing@vendor.testMarch invoice · €380
Personalhidden
friend@example.testPrivate conversation
SirenoRELAYauthfolder policysender policyrecipient policyUPSTREAM CREDS NEVER SENT TO AGENT
AGENTconnected with bearer token
“Find the invoices and send them to my financial assistant.”
TOOL CALLlist_foldersagent → SirenoRELAY
VISIBLE FOLDERS InvoicesSent / ReportsPersonal is not returned.
✕ finances@wrong.testDenied before delivery by outbound policy
✓ assistant@ledger.testAllowed retry · handed to upstream mail server
SirenoRELAY returns only folders permitted by the agent's policy.
MAILBOXDIRECT CONNECTIONAGENT
MAILBOXcredentials shared with agent
Invoices3 messages
billing@vendor.testApril invoice · €420
newsletter@vendor.testUnwanted promotion
billing@vendor.testMarch invoice · €380
Personalalso visible
friend@example.testPrivate conversation
IMAP / SMTPno policy boundarypassword available to the agent
AGENThas mailbox credentials
“Find the invoices and send them to my financial assistant.”
DIRECT REQUESTlist all foldersagent → mailbox · credentials used directly
FOLDERS VISIBLE TO AGENTInvoicesPersonalSent / ReportsNo relay policy filters this list.
DIRECT REQUESTread mailboxagent can fetch every message
MAIL VISIBLE TO AGENTApril invoice · €420Unwanted promotionPrivate conversationAll folders and senders are accessible.
Private mail and unrelated senders are exposed to the agent.
The agent sends without a relay policy check.
DIRECT SMTP SENDfinances@wrong.testagent → mail server
! Sent to finances@wrong.testNo SirenoRELAY recipient rule blocks this send.
The agent connects to the mailbox itself and receives the complete folder list.
POLICY ENGINE
A mailbox view shaped by policy, not trust.
01
Folders disappear
Unapproved folders never become part of the agent’s mailbox view or virtual IDs.
02
Senders are checked
An allowed recipient cannot make an unapproved From sender visible.
03
Recipients are enforced
Every recipient is checked before SirenoRELAY hands a message to the upstream provider.
04
Access is rechecked
Bearer-token bindings and current policy are checked again for every operation.
THE CREDENTIAL STAYS WITH THE OWNER
An MCP tool call. Not a mailbox login.
The agent sends a bearer token to SirenoRELAY’s MCP endpoint. SirenoRELAY—not the agent—loads the IMAP/SMTP credentials, talks to the mail server, applies policy, and returns only the allowed result.
AgentMCP tool call + scoped bearer token
request ↓↑ filtered result
SirenoRELAYPolicy boundary
Folder rules
Sender rules
Recipient rules
◆ Credentials never cross this boundary
authorized mail ↓↑ upstream result
Mail serverIMAP / SMTP credentials stay here
Run it under a dedicated OS service user or in an isolated container the agent cannot inspect. Do not give the agent access to the config, secret files, process environment, or a direct upstream route. Read the security model →
OWNER OPERATED
Start with a key. Not a compromise.
Install the relay in the owner-controlled environment. The agent gets a scoped token—not a way into the mailbox.
01 / INSTALLMACOS · LINUX
HomebrewAvailable after the first release.
$ brew install sergiocarracedo/tap/sirenorelay
Agent-guided setupInstall the skill, then ask your agent to use it.
Preview the owner-safe prompt
First install the SirenoRELAY setup skill with `npx skills add sergiocarracedo/sireno-relay --skill sirenorelay`. Then read and use that skill to help me install and configure SirenoRELAY on an owner-controlled account. Verify the Homebrew formula is published before using it. Keep upstream mail credentials and the relay configuration out of the agent environment; guide me through onboarding and policy validation without asking me to paste secrets into chat.
OWNER-OPERATED
Configure the boundary. Then hand over one token.
Start with interactive onboarding, inspect the policy model, and keep upstream credentials outside the agent’s reach.