YOUR MAILBOX GUARDIAN · v1.6.3

Agentic email access, on your terms.

A policy-boundary MCP between your mailbox and your agents. Control what they can see and do in your inbox: which folders, senders, and attachments they can access, and where they can send email.

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01 / DIRECT ACCESS

Without a checkpoint

The agent can use mailbox credentials directly: relay folder and sender rules do not filter its view, and sends bypass relay recipient checks. In this illustrative journey, private mail goes out and an unsafe payload comes back.

Personal folder EXPOSEDConfidential email EXPOSED

02 / SIRENORELAY CHECKPOINT

Policy checks both ways

SirenoRELAY owns upstream credentials, authenticates the agent token, filters folders and messages, and checks outbound recipients before handoff. The guard withholds private mail and stops the unsafe return here; the owner's original mail is not deleted.

Personal folder BLOCKEDConfidential email BLOCKED

ONE REQUEST · TWO OUTCOMES

Giving an agent your full mailbox is dangerous.

The invoice request below is a concrete example: compare what an agent can see and send through SirenoRELAY with what it receives when it holds direct mailbox credentials.

MAILBOXupstream · credentials stay here

Invoices3 messages

billing@vendor.testApril invoice · €420

newsletter@vendor.testHidden · sender not allowed

billing@vendor.testMarch invoice · €380

Personalhidden

friend@example.testPrivate conversation

SirenoRELAYauthfolder policysender policyrecipient policyUPSTREAM CREDS
NEVER SENT TO AGENT
AGENTconnected with bearer token

“Find the invoices and send them to my financial assistant.”

TOOL CALLlist_foldersagent → SirenoRELAY
VISIBLE FOLDERS InvoicesSent / ReportsPersonal is not returned.

SirenoRELAY returns only folders permitted by the agent's policy.

POLICY ENGINE

A mailbox view shaped by policy, not trust.

01

Folders disappear

Unapproved folders never become part of the agent’s mailbox view or virtual IDs.

02

Senders are checked

An allowed recipient cannot make an unapproved From sender visible.

03

Recipients are enforced

Every recipient is checked before SirenoRELAY hands a message to the upstream provider.

04

Access is rechecked

Bearer-token bindings and current policy are checked again for every operation.

THE CREDENTIAL STAYS WITH THE OWNER

An MCP tool call.
Not a mailbox login.

The agent sends a bearer token to SirenoRELAY’s MCP endpoint. SirenoRELAY—not the agent—loads the IMAP/SMTP credentials, talks to the mail server, applies policy, and returns only the allowed result.

AgentMCP tool call + scoped bearer token
SirenoRELAYPolicy boundary
  • Folder rules
  • Sender rules
  • Recipient rules

Credentials never cross this boundary

Mail serverIMAP / SMTP credentials stay here

Run it under a dedicated OS service user or in an isolated container the agent cannot inspect. Do not give the agent access to the config, secret files, process environment, or a direct upstream route. Read the security model →

OWNER OPERATED

Start with a key.
Not a compromise.

Install the relay in the owner-controlled environment. The agent gets a scoped token—not a way into the mailbox.

01 / INSTALLMACOS · LINUX

Homebrew Available after the first release.

$ brew install sergiocarracedo/tap/sirenorelay

Agent-guided setup Install the skill, then ask your agent to use it.

Preview the owner-safe prompt
First install the SirenoRELAY setup skill with `npx skills add sergiocarracedo/sireno-relay --skill sirenorelay`. Then read and use that skill to help me install and configure SirenoRELAY on an owner-controlled account. Verify the Homebrew formula is published before using it. Keep upstream mail credentials and the relay configuration out of the agent environment; guide me through onboarding and policy validation without asking me to paste secrets into chat.

OWNER-OPERATED

Configure the boundary.
Then hand over one token.

Start with interactive onboarding, inspect the policy model, and keep upstream credentials outside the agent’s reach.

Read the docs →